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JUSTICE BRENNAN'S PHILOSOPHY OF
FEDERALISM
The power to make fundamental decisions affecting our social
and economic welfare is shared under our federal form of government between the states and the national government.1 The way
that the states and the national government share in that power,
however, is far from a static concept.' Rather, the concept of federalism is dynamic,3 ever changing as opposed philosophies exert their
pressures on it. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., has had a strong
impact on modern notions of federalism through his range of opin4
ions over the three decades he has served on the Supreme Court.
Justice Brennan's philosophy of federalism is reflected in his
opinions concerning the relationship between state and federal
courts and between state and federal legislatures.5 Throughout these
opinions, Justice Brennan has espoused the view that the states
have an important role under our federal scheme. The national government, in contrast, has only those powers that the states granted
to it under the Constitution.7 The national government's powers are
therefore limited in number.9 The only limits to the exercise of
granted powers, however, are the Bill of Rights9 and the necessary
and proper clause. 1" Justice Brennan rejects the proposition that the
1. A federal form of government distributes power between a central authority
and a number of consistituent territorial units (i.e., the states). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 549 (5th ed. 1979).
2. Monaghan, The Burger Court and "Our Federalism", 43 LAW & CONTrEMP.
PROBS. 39 (1980).
3. Id.
4. Justice Brennan was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1956 by President
Eisenhower. For an excellent guide to information about Justice Brennan's career, see
Robins, A Bibliography of Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 12 SETON HALL
L. REV. 430 (1982).
5. Professor Monaghan distinguishes between "substantive" federalism and
"procedural" federalism. Monaghan, supra note 2, at 39. Substantive federalism refers to the power to decide the content of public policy, which is shared by the state
and federal legislative and executive branches. Id. Procedural federalism refers to the
relationship between federal courts and state courts. Id. Part one of this paper will
discuss Justice Brennan's views on procedural federalism. Part two of this paper will
discuss Justice Brennan's views on substantive federalism.
6. See Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 945, 946-47
(1964) [hereinafter Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism].
7. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 862 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
8. Id. at 858-59. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (J. Madison).
9. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 861.
10. Id. at 862-63.
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retained sovereignty of the states" is a limit to those powers that
the states surrendered to the national government in the
Constitution.12
Not everyone shares Justice Brennan's view of federalism. 3 A
few years ago, a majority 4 of the Supreme Court ruled that that
retained sovereignty of the states was a limit on Congress' exercise
of its power under the commerce clause. 5 Although that decision
was recently reversed, the reversal"6 was only by a five to four majority.' 7 The Constitution is approaching the 200th anniversary of its
adoption, but the members of the Court and the citizens of this
country are still divided about how that document allocates power
between the states and the national government.
Increasingly, advocates of states' rights' s have urged that the
national government cut back in many areas.' 9 They ask that Congress leave the states free from excessive legislation,"0 and that fed11. Id. at 858.
12. Id.
13. On the present Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell
and O'Connor oppose Justice Brennan's views on federalism. See Garcia v. San
Antonio metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1021 (1985) (dissenting opinions). Former Chief Justice Burger also opposed Justice Brennan's position. Id. The
view of the newest member of the Court, Justice Scalia, is presently unclear. See 55
U.S.L.W. 2225, 2226 (Oct. 28, 1986) (summary of Professor Tribe's remarks at Constitutional Law Conference).
14. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell. National League of Cities,
426 U.S. 833.
15. Id. at 852.
16. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 105 S. Ct.
1005 (1985).
17. Id. Justice Blackmun, who switched his vote from the National League of
Cities decision, wrote for the Court, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, White, and
Stevens. Id.
18. President Reagan has frequently supported legislation that would shift a
great deal of power from the national government to the states. For an example of his
administration's proposals in the area of federal court-state court relations, see
Smith, New 'Federalism' Proposals Outlined By Smith, 6 ST. CT. J. 25(3) (1982)
[hereinafter Smith, New Federalism].
States' rights advocates also include in their number many state court judges and
officials, and several legal scholars. See, e.g., Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal
Jurisdiction:A FederalJudge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity, and the Federal
Caseload, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORDER 557; Mosk, Rediscovering the 10th Amendment,
20 JUDGES J. 16(5) (1981); O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from the Perspectiveof a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 801 (1981); Reynoldson, Iowa's Chief Justice Discusses State-Federal Judicial Relations, 6 ST. CT. J. 24(3) (1982).
19. One example is the use of the federal habeas corpus. See, e.g., O'Connor,
supra note 18, at 802-06; Reynoldson, supra note 18, at 24; Smith, New Federalism,
supra note 18, at 26-27.
20. An example of federal legislation that states' rights advocates feel is excessively intrusive is the statute in National League of Cities v. Usery, which set minimum wages and maximum hours for many state employees. 426 U.S. 833.
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eral courts cut back their jurisdiction on many cases. 21 Their goal is
increased efficiency in government. 22 Justice Brennan's contribution
to the idea of federalism is to remind us that this is a nation of
individuals with certain guaranteed liberties; we cannot guarantee
those liberties if our primary goal is efficiency in government. Our
country's founders 8 adopted a federal form of government, argues
Justice Brennan, primarily because of4 their distrust of centralized
2
power and the tyranny it can lead to.
Justice Brennan recognizes that the division of power between
the states and the national government helps assure individual liberties by giving individuals parallel forums, to address alleged violations of their rights.2 " If one forum prejudices an individual's rights
through a procedural error, the individual may seek redress in the
other forum.2 6 Justice Brennan's view of federalism would ensure
that neither the power of the states nor the federal government is
expanded at the expense of the other. Otherwise, individuals would
27
be deprived of one of the parallel guardians of their rights.
This comment will examine several Supreme Court decisions
which reflect Justice Brennan's views on federalism.28 The first part
of this comment will examine decisions which affect the relationship
between state courts and federal courts. 2 This includes state prisoners' use of federal writs of habeas corpus 0 to gain their release because of alleged constitutional violations. It also includes cases discussing the doctrines of interventions1 and abstention,3 2 which deal
with the propriety of a federal court interfering with state court pro21. See supra note 19.
22. See Smith, New Federalism, supra note 18, at 27.
23. There is much debate over how much deference should be given to the
sometimes conflicting views of our founding fathers. For the view that the opinions of
our founding fathers on matters of present constitutional questions should be given
little weight, see L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THis HONORABLE COURT 45-47 (1985).
24. Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners:An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423, 442 (1961) [hereinafter Brennan, Federal Habeas
Corpus].
25. See Brennan, "How Goes The Supreme Court?", 36 MERCER L. REV. 781,
785 (1985) [hereinafter Brennan, The Supreme Court].
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Federalism concerns play a part in a wide range of Supreme Court decisions. Only a few representative areas are discussed in this paper. For more expansive
development of federalism issues in other contexts, see Howard, The States And The
Supreme Court, 31 CATH. U. L. REV. 375 (1982) (discussing federalism concerns in
federal civil rights actions, Eleventh Amendment defenses, federal habeas corpus actions, and the doctrines of abstention and intervention); Monaghan, supra note 2
(tenth amendment issues, abstention and intervention).
29. See infra notes 39-108 and accompanying text.
30. For background information on federal habeas corpus, see infra note 75.
31. For background information on intervention, see infra note 76.
32. For background information on abstention, see infra note 99.
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ceedings3 3 The second part of this comment will examine decisions
discussing the tenth amendment s4 and the retained powers of the
States as external limitations on Congress' power under the commerce clause.35 The third part of this comment discusses Justice
Brennan's proposal that state constitutions be utilized to expand individual rights," especially when the Supreme Court is reluctant to
read those rights in the United States Constitution." This comment
concludes with a synthesis of Justice Brennan's view on federalism
from these discussion, 8 and an evaluation of those views.
STATE COURTS AND FEDERAL COURTS: PARALLEL GUARDIANS OF
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Perhaps the most common source of friction between the states
and the national government 9 occurs when an individual sues a
state in federal court for alleged constitution violations.40 Justice
Brennan's feels that the federal courts should be accessible to persons with these complaints,"' because the federal courts have the
power and the duty to uphold an individual's constitutional rights."'
Many on the Supreme Court disagree,"3 believing that the individual
33. See infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
35. See infra notes 109-148 and accompanying text.
36. See infra note 153.
37. Justice Brennan has publicly criticized the majority of the Court for its
"door-closing" decisions which deprive individuals of a federal forum for their Constitutional grievances. See Brennan, Remarks of Associate Justice William J. Brennan,
Jr., Seventy-Fifth Anniversary Dinner, 36 RUTGERS L.REy. 725, 728 (1984).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 167-177.
39. In the year-ending June, 1981, for example, state prisoners had filed nearly
7,800 habeas corpus petitions in the federal courts. Smith, New Federalism, supra
note 18, at 25.
40. Individuals may sue state officials in federal court to obtain injunctive or
monetary relief for violations of their federal rights. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1986). However, the Eleventh Amendment bars some suits in federal
court against state officials, depending on the nature of the relief sought. See, e.g.,
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (Eleventh Amendment bars suit by individual seeking to impose liability payable out of a state treasury). For detailed analysis
of the relationship between the Eleventh Amendment and federalism, see Baker,
Federalismand the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 139 (1977); Thornton,
The Eleventh Amendment: An Endangered Species, 55 IND. L.J. 293 (1980). For Justice Brennan's view on the proper role of the Eleventh Amendment, see Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3150 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. Brennan, supra note 25, at 785.
42. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441 (1963).
43. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Powell, and O'Connor consistently have held that deference to state court proceedings should limit a federal
court's ability to act. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (Justice
Rehnquist writing for majority, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell,
Stewart, Blackmun and Stevens); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (Justice Powell
writing for majority, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Stewart,
Blackmun and Stevens). See also O'Connor, supra note 18 (Justice O'Connor's
views).
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should seek redress in the state courts to permit the states to rectify
any errors on their own." Those that hold the latter position believe
that notions of comity,"' or deference to the state courts, should be
considered in deciding
whether a federal court has the power to en46
tertain such a suit.

In contrast, Justice Brennan argues that notions of comity are
irrelevant to the existence of the power of the federal courts,"
which comes ultimately from the Constitution." Comity, Justice
Brennan believes, plays a role only in the discretionary exercise of a
federal court's power.4 9 In his view, notions of comity should prevent
a federal court from acting only under extraordinary
circumstances."
Fay v. Noia is an early example of Justice Brennan's belief that
federal courts should abstain from exercising their jurisdiction only
in extraordinary circumstances.5 Noia was convicted of felony murder in New York state court.2 The only evidence against Noia was
his confession, which Noia claimed was coerced in violation of the
fourteenth amendment.13 Noia did not appeal his conviction in the
state courts."' Twenty years later, however, he sought his release by
a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court. 55 Noia's writ
was denied for failure to exhaust his state remedies."6 The federal
court of appeals reversed,5 7 and issued the writ. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, the State of New York argued that the federal district court lacked the power to issue the writ because Noia had declined to appeal his conviction in the state courts.5 8 In the majority
opinion, Justice Brennan wrote that the federal district court's
power to hear the case was based on the alleged constitutional violation, not upon the procedural history of the case in the state
59

courts.

44. O'Connor, supra note 18, at 802-03.
45. "Comity" refers to the respect and deference given by federal courts to state
courts. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 420.
46. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 83 (1977).
47. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 426-27.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 438.
50. Id.
51. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
52. Id. at 394.
53. Id. at 394-95.
54. Id. at 395. Noia failed to appeal for two reasons: first, he did not have the
funds needed for appeal; second, he was afraid that if he was unsuccessful, he would
receive the death sentence. Id. at 397 n.3.
55. Id. at 396.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 397.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 426-27.
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Justice Brennan wrote that the overriding concern of the federal district court is the preservation of constitutional right of individuals, not notions of comity.s According to Justice Brennan, comity, concerns of federalism, and respect for state procedures are
factors a federal district court may consider when deciding when to
exercise its power, but they do not affect the raw judicial power of
the court to do so. 1 For example, comity can cause a federal court
to temporarily abstain from exercising its power to issue a writ of
habeas corpus while a prisoner seeks state-provided relief 2 Comity,
though, does not divest the federal court of the power to act in that
situation.
Recently, several members of the Supreme Court, many state
court judges, and others have expressed concern that the widespread
use of the writ of habeas corpus undermines orderly and efficient
state administration of Justice."3 The Reagan administration, for example, is concerned that the availability of federal habeas corpus
puts in question the finality of any state conviction.6 4 The Reagan
administration points to cases like Fay v. Noia,6 5 where a prisoner
gained his release twenty years after his conviction, as examples of
their concern. To preserve the values of federalism, they argue, we
must greatly restrict the availability of federal habeas corpus.6 6 This
60. Id. at 420.
61. Id. at 425.
62. Id. Justice Brennan wrote, "The same considerations of comity that led the
court to refuse relief to one who had not yet availed himself of his same remedies
likewise prompted the refusal of relief to one who had inexcusably failed to tender
the federal questions to the State courts. Either situation poses a threat to the orderly administration of criminal justice that ought if possible be averted." Id.
63. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 445 (Clark, J., dissenting) (the decision
will mean a "rash of new applications . . . and 98% of them will be frivolous");
O'Connor, supra note 18, at 801 ("The labyrinth of judicial reviews of the various
stages of a state criminal felony case would appear strange, indeed, to a rational person charged with devising an ideal criminal justice system."); Reynoldson, supra note
18, at 24 ("The first question I pose is why - in an era of crushing federal case loads,
limited federal funds, and the welcomed resurrection of federalism - there is an unrelenting oversight of state judicial operation.").
64. Smith, New Federalism, supra note 18, at 25.
65. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
66. "Under current law, habeas corpus petitions can be brought at any time,
without limitation. The practical effect of this approach is that petitions are sometimes brought many years, or even decades, after the conclusion of state proceedings." Smith, New Federalism, supra note 18, at 27. Former Attorney General
Smith's proposal for a statute of limitations on federal habeas corpus, id., would certainly alleviate practical problems to a state when a habeas corpus petition is filed
many years after a conviction. A statute of limitations, however, would arbitrarily cut
off even deserving claims. In order to safeguard the liberties of possibly wrongly incarcerated individuals, it is better to continue the present policy of letting the federal court judge decide whether the prisoner's claim has any merit to it. Cf. Brennan,
Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 24, at 441-42. Our criminal justice system is
founded on principles of preservation of individual liberties, not on concerns for efficiency. In addition, it is the prisoner who is incarcerated for many years who stands
to lose the most if wrongly imprisoned; a statute of limitations would cut off relief
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would show the proper deference to the capability of state court
judges to uphold constitutional rights."'
Justice Brennan, as a former state court judge, 8 recognizes the
difficulties that the use of federal habeas corpus can pose for the
state courts. 9 In response, Justice Brennan suggests that the appropriate remedy is not to cut back on federal habeas corpus, but to
improve state court criminal procedures." Justice Brennan urges
that the states improve their procedures to guarantee their citizens'
constitutional rights will be upheld.7 If state procedures made these
guarantees, or even surpassed them, then there would be no need for
72
federal habeas corpus.
In habeas corpus cases, the federal court acts only after a state
has convicted an individual in violation of his constitutional rights.1
Sometimes, however, an individual petitions a federal court to enjoin a threatened state criminal prosecution in order to preserve his
constitutional rights before conviction.7 4 The federal court must decide whether to intervene or not to protect the individual.7 The federalism concern under these circumstances is greater than in federal
habeas corpus proceeding because intervention anticipates a state
violation of an individual's rights.7 6 Generally, the federal courts asfrom those who need it most.
67. Many commentators have criticized what they perceive as mistrust of state
court judges to uphold the Constitution. E.g., Aldisert, supra note 18, at 557-58;
O'Connor, supra note 18, at 802-03; Reynoldson, supra note 18, at 26; Smith, New
Federalism, supra note 39, at 27.
For the opinion that federal court judges do a better job in upholding Constitutional rights, see Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
68. Justice Brennan has explained that, as a United States Supreme Court Justice, he has had to rule differently on some issues than he did as a New Jersey State
Supreme Court Justice. Brennan, The Roles of the State Supreme Court Justices
and the United States Supreme Court Justice, 56 N.Y. ST. B.J. 6 (1984).
69. Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, supra note 6.
70. Id. at 957-59; Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 24, 441.
71. Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism,supra note 6, at 957; Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 24, at 441.;
72. Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism,supra note 6, at 957; Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 24, at 441.
73. In federal habeas corpus cases, the jurisdiction of the federal court is governed by federal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1983). The history of the writ of habeas
corpus goes back centuries into the English common law. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at
402. "Its root principle," wrote Justice Brennan, "is that in a civilized society, government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the
imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of
law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release." Id. For the history of the
writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts, see id. at 399-415; Brennan, Federal
Habeas Corpus, supra note 24, at 426-30.
74. E.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). See infra notes 79-89 and
accompanying text.
75. The federal court could intervene either by declaring the state criminal statute unconstitutional, or by directly enjoining state officials from prosecuting an individual. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
76. Federal court jurisdiction to intervene in state court proceedings is given by
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sume that the state courts will uphold the Constitution 7 and therefore normally refuse to interfere with state criminal proceedings until a right has actually been violated.7
7
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Dombrowski v. Pfister 9
recognized an exception to this general rule. In Dombrowski, a Louisiana statute made certain subversive activities illegal.8 0 The plaintiffs contended that the statute violated the Constitution on its face,
because it was overbroad, and could be used to infringe upon the
plaintiffs' first amendment guarantee of freedom of expression.81
The plaintiffs also alleged that threats to enforce the statute were in
bad faith, done merely to harass the plaintiffs and not to secure
valid convictions. 82 Justice Brennan wrote that, in this situation, the
federal court should not abstain from exercising its power because
the state criminal procedure could not guarantee adequate vindication of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.8" The damage would be
done prior to any conviction, and would be an irreparable injury to
the plaintiffs.8s The concerns of federalism are not as great here as
the serious adverse effects on the individual rights.8"
To Justice Brennan, in this case as in Fay v. Noia,s6 concerns of
the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 actions were implemented by
Congress following the Civil War to give individuals, especially in southern states, a
federal forum to hear their grievances based on the Constitution. See Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 5 (1980). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
77. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485-86.
78. Id.
79. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
80. The statutes in question were the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law, LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:358-74 (Cum. Supp. 1962), and the Communist Propaganda Control law, LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14.390-90.8 (Cum. Supp. 1962). These
statutes made it a felony to assist in the formation of, or contribute to the support of
any subversive organization. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 493 nn.9, 10. They also made it
a felony to fail to register as members of a Communist-front organization. Id. at 49293.
81. The plaintiffs were the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., an organization active in promoting civil rights for Negroes in Louisiana, its Executive Director, Mr. Dombrowski, its Treasurer, Mr. Smith, and its attorney, Mr. Walter,
Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 478. The plaintiffs claimed that the mere threat of prosecution by the state was an infringement on their first amendment rights, U.S. CONST.
amend. I, because it discouraged them from lawful political expression. Dombrowski,
480 U.S. at 482.
82. Dombrowski, 480 U.S. at 482.
83. Id. at 485.
84. Id. at 486.
85. Id. at 489.
86. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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federalism did not affect the power of the federal courts to act, but
only affected the proper exercise of the court's power.87 Concerns of
federalism and comity may make it wise for the federal courts to
abstain from exercising the full extent of their power in some situation.8 8 Yet, when the federalism concerns can by removed or shown
to be minimal, then the federal court should exercise its power to
preserve individual rights.89
Recently, those who opposed Justice Brennan's opinion in Dowbrowski have succeeded in greatly curtailing federal intervention
into state court proceeding.9 In a line of decisions beginning with
Younger v. Harris,"' the Supreme Court has greatly restricted the
intervention power of federal district courts.2 These decisions em87. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 483-85.
88. See supra note 78.
89. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 492.
90. The majority in Dombrowski included, besides Justice Brennan, Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Goldberg, and White. Justices Black and Stewart
did not take part in this case. The dissenters were Justices Harlan and Clark. See
Heck, Justice Brennan and the Heyday of Warren Court Liberalism, 20 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 841, 856-58 (1980). On the present Court, only Justice Brennan and
Justice White remain. However, the opposition to Dombrowski in the dissent of Justice Harlan, 380 U.S. at 498, based on concerns of federalism, id., is echoed by many
of the present members of the Court. See, e.g., Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 60305 (1975) (opinion by Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Powell, J.). One commentator has expressed the unorthodox view that Dombrowski was decided on the
wrong grounds, and was actually restrictive of federal power, because it treated intervention as an exception to the general rule, instead of as the rule itself. Laycock,
Federal Interference With State Prosecutions: The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 46
U.CHi. L. REV. 636 (1979).
91. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
92. In Younger, the Court held that intervention into pending state criminal
action is improper except in "extraordinary circumstances." Id. at 43. The Court also
held that the decision in Dombrowski "should not be regarded as having upset the
settled doctrines that have always confined very narrowly the availability of injunctive relief against state criminal prosecutions." Id. at 53. The Court did not go as far
as saying that circumstances such as bad faith or harassment, present in Dombrowski,
were prerequisites for Dombrowski-type relief. Id. at 54. Subsequent cases have made
it clear, however, that unless a federal plaintiff alleges bad faith or harassment by
state officials, then Younger dictates that the federal court should almost always abstain from interfering in the state court proceedings. E.g., Huffman v. Pursue, 420
U.S. 592, 601-02 (1975).
In Huffman, the Court began to apply the Younger abstention doctrine to civil
cases. 420 U.S. at 604. The sheriff and prosecuting attorney of Allen County, Ohio,
instituted civil proceedings against the operator of a theatre which showed pornographic films, in violation of a state public nuisance statute, OHio REV. CODE ANN. §
3767.01 (1971). Id. at 598. The trial court found the operator liable and ordered the
theatre closed for one year and the theatre's personal property sold. Id. Prior to judgment, Pursue, Ltd., decided not to appeal the judgment in the state courts, but filed
suit in federal court seeking to have the nuisance statute declared unconstitutional.
Id. The district court granted limited injunctive relief. Id. at 599. The Supreme Court
vacated that judgment and remanded with instructions to apply the Younger doctrine to this case, effectively forcing the district court to abstain. Id. at 612.
The majority in Huffman held that the same considerations of comity and federalism present in Younger were present here. Id. at 604. The court ruled that the
plaintiff, Pursue, Ltd., "should not be permitted the luxury of federal litigation of
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phasize the importance of federalism concerns in prohibiting intervention in pending" criminal, and even civil,94 state court cases.
Justice Brennan dissented in almost all of these decisions,95 especially in the decisions extending the Younger abstention doctrine to
civil proceedings."9
When a state brings a civil or quasi-criminal action against an
individual, the individual does not have the same procedural safeguards that are present in criminal proceedings. 97 Consequently,
Justice Brennan argued the importance of a federal forum is much
greater to an individual defending an allegedly unconstitutional
state civil proceeding than to a state criminal defendant.9" Abstention would be improper for a federal court under those circumstances. 9 Abstention, says Justice Brennan, is permissible "only in
narrowly limited 'special circumstances'. 1 0
These "special circumstances" include when a state criminal
0
and where unprosecutions is pending, as in Younger v. Harris,"'
certainty involving interpretation of state law makes resolution of a
constitutional issue premature. 102 While the Younger doctrine has
its roots in federalism concerns,01 the second form of abstention approved by Justice Brennan does not. Abstention in cases involving
issues presented by ongoing state proceedings, a luxury which . . . is quite costly in
terms of the interests which Younger seeks to protect." Id. at 605-06. The Huffman
Court did not, however, make a blanket application of Younger to all civil litigation.
Id. at 607.
Later cases extended the Younger doctrine to other types of civil proceedings. In
Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), the Court held that the Younger principles applied to federal review of state civil contempt proceedings. Id. at 335. In Trainor v.
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977), the Court extended Younger and Huffman to an
action by the State of Illinois to recover welfare payments that had been allegedly
obtained through fraud. Id. at 444. The underlying principle in these decisions is that
the federal courts should refrain from any action until state court remedies are
exhausted.
93. In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), Justice Brennan, for a unanimous Court, wrote that the Younger doctrine of federal court abstention except in
extraordinary circumstances applied only to pending state actions. Id. When no arrests have been made or charges files, the concerns of federalism and comity upon
which Younger was based are lacking. Id. at 462. Justice Brennan wrote that, in fact,
"[i]n the instant case, principles of federalism not only do not preclude federal intervention, they compel it. Requiring the federal courts totally to step aside plaintiff
would turn federalism on its head." Id. at 472.
94. See supra note 92.
95. Justice Brennan concurred in the result only of Younger, 401 U.S. at 56.
96. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. at 450 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Juidice v.
Vail, 430 U.S. at 341 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at
613 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 615-616 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullen, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972).
101. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
102. Lake Carriers' Ass'n, 406 U.S. at 510.
103. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45.
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uncertain state law is based on the possibility that subsequent state
court decisions on state law could reduce the federal decision to a
mere advisory opinion." 4 Abstention until state law is clarified
avoids this possibility and is therefore justified." 5
Abstention on the grounds of federalism, however, is justified
only in the "special circumstance" of a pending state criminal prosecution. 06 Only then are the concerns for federalism strong enough to
justify a federal court from refusing to exercise its power and duty
to preserve individual constitutional rights.10 7 Because the reason
for a federal system of government is to ensure individual liberties, 08 the values of federalism are served best by preserving both
state and federal forums as guardians. Closing the federal courts to
individuals seeking vindication of their rights is antithetical to the
true reasons for federalism.
FEDERALISM AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT

While the conflicts between state courts and federal courts are
the most common source of friction between the states and the national government,'09 the conflicts between state legislatures and
Congress are the most dramatic. Under the Constitution, the states
granted Congress a limited number of specified powers,"0 and the
ability to carry out those powers,"' while reserving all the powers
not specifically given to the federal government for the states." 2
Some Supreme Court justices and many scholars have interpreted
104.

Lake Carriers'Ass'n, 406 U.S. at 510-11.

105. Id. at 510.
106. Younger, 401 U.S. at 56-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 614 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. "Federalism is a device for realizing the concepts of decency and fairness
which are among the fundamental principles of liberty and justice lying at the base of
all of our civil and political institutions." Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus, supra
note 24, at 442.
109. See supra note 39.
110. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 859 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting (quoting M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405-06 (1819)).
111. "The Congress shall have Power... To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers ..
" U.S. CONST.
art. I, sec. 8. The test of whether a law is "necessary and proper" to carry out a
specified power of Congress was spelled out many years ago. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 421. "Let the end [of the law] be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional." Id. This test gives wide discretion to Congress in the
exercise of its enumerated powers. The last time the Supreme Court invalidated an
act of Congress based on the commerce power, U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, was fifty
years ago. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
112. The tenth amendment reads simply: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to
the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
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this reservation, expressed in the tenth amendment, to be nothing
more than a truism: what has not been given has been retained. 1 3
Under this view, Congress can exercise only those powers granted to
it, but the only 4limits on granted powers are the guarantees of the
11
Bill of Rights.
Others, however, have read the tenth amendment as much more
than a truism." 5 They see it as a limit, in the name of federalism,
even upon those powers granted to Congress." 6 They perceive the
structure of our government to be an affirmative limitation on the
powers of the national government. A decade ago, the Supreme
Court adopted that theory and rejected the "truism" view of the
tenth amendment,' 7 only to overrule itself a year ago." 8 Justice
Brennan is one of the justices who sees the tenth amendment as
prohibiting Congress only from exercising non-granted powers, not
as a limit on the exercise of granted powers." 9
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 20 the Supreme Court
held that a federal statute,' 2' promulgated under the power of the
Commerce Clause, 22 setting minimum wage and maximum hour
levels for almost all state employees was unconstitutional. 2 The
Court reasoned that the statute was invalid because it regulated the
"States as States.' 24 The Court found that concern for state sovereignty in a federal system was an affirmative limitation on Congress'
2 5
otherwise valid exercise of power under the Commerce Clause.1
The Court found an expression of this affirmative limitation in the
tenth amendment. 2 In adopting the tenth amendment, ruled the
Court, the framers of the constitution declared a "constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs
the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a fed113. This view was first expressed in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124
(1941). It has been repeated many times since. E.g., National League of Cities, 426
U.S. at 862 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842-43.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct.
1005 (1985).
119. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 862 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
121. The statutes in question were the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1983).
122. "The Congress shall have Power.... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several states. . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl.
3.
123. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 836.
124. Id. at 854. A law regulates "States as States" when it "operate[s] to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions .
Id. at 852.
I."
125. Id. at 841.
126. Id. at 842-43.
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eral system.' 2 7 The Court therefore held the statute invalid to the
extent it "displace[d] the States' freedom to structure integral operations . . .of traditional governmental functions ....128
Justice Brennan dissented from the Court's holding.'2" Justice
Brennan argued that the guarantee of the integrity of the states and
of their ability to function is found in the political process,1 30 not in
the Constitution. He rejected the concept of the tenth amendment
as an affirmative limitation on Congress' powers, citing over 150
years of case law to support his position.' 3 ' The states, wrote Justice
Brennan, surrendered certain powers ot Congress when they
adopted the Constitution. 3 2 The only affirmative limitations on
these powers are certain guarantees of the Bill of Rights.'33 Beyond
these,'34" only discretion on the part of Congress,
embodied in the
3 5
political process, limits the federal power.1
The decision in National League of Cities caused a great stir in
academic circles. Many scholars attacked the decision, 36 but others
supported it.' In the cases that followed, the principles in National
League of Cities were affirmed,'2 8 although the Court never again
found a federal statute unconstitutional on those principles. 39 The
test which the Court developed to determine whether a federal law
127. Id. at 843 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
128. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
129. Id. at 856 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 857 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131. Justice Brennan cited Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). He
quoted from Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in Gibbons:
The power over commerce ... is vested in Congress so absolutely as it would
be in an single government having in its constitution the same restrictions on
the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States.
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and
the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are . . .the sole
restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse.
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 857 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 197).
132. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 858. Of course, the means used to achieve legitimate ends must be
appropriate ones under the necessary and proper clause. Id. at 861.
134. Id. at 861.
135. Id. at 857-58.
136. E.g., Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis The States: The
Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977).
137. E.g., Nagel, Federalismas a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 81.

138. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765-766 (1982); United Transport
Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 286-88 (1981); Beschle, Defining the
Scope of State Sovereignty Under the Tenth Amendment: A Structural Approach,
34 DE PAUL L. REV. 163, 169-73 (1984).
139. E.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983) (extension of Age Discrimination in Employment Act ot the States is upheld); Beschle, supra note 138, at
169-75.
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regulated the "States as States"' 40 proved too difficult to pass.""
National League of Cities was overruled last year by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. 4" Justice Blackmun
joined the four members of the minority in National League of Cities to form the majority in Garcia. 43 Justice Blackmun's opinion
stated that the sole guarantee of state autonomy was the political
process. 1 44 Each state is equally represented in the Senate, and pro-

portionately represented in the House of Representatives. 145 The
discretion of these representatives will
adequately safeguard state
1 4
sovereignty from excessive legislation.

The dissenters 14 7 to Garcia reaffirmed their view that the tenth
amendment acts as an affirmative limitation on Congressional power
under the Commerce Clause. 48 Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor both indicated a willingness to overrule Garcia and reaffirm National League of Cities should the opportunity present itself.1 4 1 A change in the membership of the Court could create such
an opportunity. A switch of a single vote would again result in a
fundamental change in the way the Supreme Court views the relationship between a federal government power and concerns of
federalism.
140.

See supra note 124.

141. Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S. Ct. 1005, 101-15 (1985). The test was summarized in Hodel:
[I]n order to succeed, a claim that congressional commerce power legislation is
invalid under the reasoning of National League of Cities must satisfy each of
three requirements. First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute
regulates the "States as States." Second, the federal regulation must address
matters that are indisputably "attribute[s] of state sovereignty." And third, it
must be apparent that the States' compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions."
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287-88 (citations omitted). See also Beschle, supra note 138, 17585 (author proposed alternative test to identify "core" state sovereignty).
142.

469 U.S. 528, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).

143. 469 U.S. 528, 105 S. Ct. at 1007; Stewart, Court Flip-Flops on 10th
Amendment, 71 A.B.A.J. 114 (1985).
144.

Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S. Ct. at 1018.

145.

Id.

146.

105 S.Ct. at 1018-19.

147. Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor each wrote dissenting opinions.
Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1021 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist and O'Connor, J.J.); id. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting, joined by Powell and Rehnquist, J.J.).
148.

Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1022-23 (Powell, J., dissenting).
at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 1038 (O'Connor, J.,

149. Id.
dissenting).
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FEDERALISM AND THE USE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

To

PRESERVE

As noted above, 50 Justice Brennan rejects the proposition that
the values of federalism serve as external limits on the power of the
national government. This does not mean that Justice Brennan believes that the states' role in our federal system is always subservient to the national government's role. To the contrary, Justice
Brennan believes the states have a vital role in securing the goal of
federalism: the preservation of individual rights. 5 '
One area where Justice Brennan believes that the states are supreme is in the interpretation of their own laws and constitutions.,
This view is implicit in Justice Brennan's opinion that abstention is
proper to avoid the risk of advisory opinions, 53 where a state court
may interpret its laws to be consistent with the Constitution. This
view is made explicit in Justice Brennan's recent support of the
movement to use state constitutions to guarantee rights that the Supreme court has refused to recognize under the United States
54
Constitution.
Justice Brennan's landmark essay on state constitutions generated a flurry of state court decisions. 5 State supreme courts seized
upon Justice Brennan's invitation to interpret state constitutions
more broadly than the United States Constitution. In several instances, state courts interpreted identically-phrased portions of
state constitutions expressly at odds with Supreme Court holdings
under the Constitution.156 Generally, the state court holdings
granted individuals greater liberties under state constitutions than
the United States Constitution guaranteed, as interpreted by a ma5 7
jority of the Supreme Court.
Civil libertarians were quick to seize upon this opportunity to
make an end-run around what they perceived as unduly conservative pronouncements of the Burger (now Rehnquist) Court. The
ACLU, for example, made a conscious strategic decision to reduce
150. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
151. Brennan, The Supreme Court, supra note 25, at 874-85; Brennan, Federal
Habeas Corpus, supra note 24, at 442; Brennan, Extension of the Bill of Rights to
the States, 44 J. URB. L. 11, 23-24 (1966).
152. Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, supra note 6, at 946.
153. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
154. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Brennan, The Supreme Court, supra note 25, at 783; Brennan, State Constitutions
and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
155. See Lousin, Justice Brennan: A Tribute To A Federal Judge Who Believes In States' Rights, 20 J. MAR. L. REV. 1,2 (1986).
156. See Lousin, supra note 155, at 4 (discussing California decisions).
157. People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 40 Crim. L. Rptr. (BNA) 2145 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1986).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 20:149

the number of petitions for writ of certiorari filed with the Supreme
Court and to increase the number of cases utilizing state constitutional law.'0 8 The ACLU sought to convince state supreme courts to
interpret state constitutions in a manner more favorable to the interests of the ACLU.
The dangers in this strategy of bypassing the Supreme Court
are the substantive risk of inconsistent constitutional rulings and
the societal risk of lost respect for the Supreme Court. The first
danger is already being realized. The number of decisions where
state constitutions are interpreted at odds with the Constitution increases almost daily.' 0 These decisions place in jeopardy the need
for national uniformity in constitutional law.
The second danger of the strategy is that the general public will
interpret the states' actions as a rejection of the Supreme Court's
leadership and final authority on constitutional matters. The
ACLU's strategy is an example of how a segment of society has already chosen to disregard Supreme Court pronouncements and to
attempt to convince others that Supreme Court decisions should be
disregarded as simply wrong. If this risk is left unchecked, it could
undermine the credibility of the Supreme Court, in an era when the
Court's reputation is already in decline.
Fortunately, however, not all state supreme courts have been
quick to substitute their judgment for that of the Supreme Court's.
Recognizing the need for uniformity, several courts have stated a
reluctance to interpret state constitutions differently than Supreme
Court pronouncements on the Constitution, based merely on dislike
for the Supreme Court's decision.600 Significantly, a few courts have
adopted guidelines for determining in what situations they will interpret state provisions differently than federal.'
For example, the Supreme Court of Washington published a list
of six criteria as guidelines for such a determination." 2 These guidelines assure that a different interpretation of similar provisions is
based upon sound independent reasons, not mere disapproval of a
158. Brennan, The Supreme Court, supra note 25, at 781-82.
159. People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 40 Crim. L. Rptr. 2145.
160. See People v. Class, 39 Crim. L. Rptr. (BNA) 2241 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986).
161. State v. Gunwall, 39 Crim. L. Rptr. (BNA) 2221 (Wash. 1986). The court
listed the following six "neutral criteria":
(1) textual language;
(2) differences in the texts;
(3) constitutional history;
(4) pre-existing state law;
(5) structural differences; and
(6) matters of particular state or local concerns.
162. Id.

19861

Federalism

Supreme Court result.'63 All state supreme courts should follow this
approach in order to assure respect for the Supreme Court as an
institution, if not for the Court's decisions themselves.
Justice Brennan's support for the movement to expand the use
of state constitutions was in response to Supreme Court decisions in
the early 1970s which he characterized as "isolated and systematic
violations of civil liberties."164 Justice Brennan criticizes more
harshly those Supreme Court decisions, such as in the area of
habeas corpus, 6 which decline to decide at all the extent of constitutional rights. 6' Justice Brennan argues that Supreme Court decisions which defer to the state courts for a final decision on an individual's constitutional claims are mistaken application of the
67
notions of comity and federalism.
The Supreme Court's mistake, argues Justice Brennan, is in its
understanding of the purpose of our federal structure.' s Justice
Brennan believes that the purpose of the federal structure is to provide "a double source of protection" for individual rights, thereby
preserving individual liberty."6 The Supreme Court, however, seems
to believe that the federal structure was adopted to preserve states'
rights, not individual rights.17 0 This basic difference of opinion over
the purpose of federalism lies at the heart of the two sides' disagreement over issues such as the proper scope of federal habeas corpus
and the use of the tenth amendment as an external limit to Congressional power.
Both sides rely on the text of the Constitution' 7 ' and upon the
163. Id.
164. Brennan, The Roles of the State Supreme Court Justice and the United
States Supreme Court Justice, 56 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 6, 8 (Oct. 1984). Justice Brennan
was referring to cases such as Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), and Hicks v.
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975). In Stone, the Court held that state prisoners could no
longer be granted federal habeas corpus relief on grounds that evidence introduced at
trial was obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure. 428 U.S. at 494.
The Court came to this conclusion because it reasoned that the exclusionary rule
contributed little as a deterrent in the federal habeas corpus context, but cost society
substantially. Id. at 495.
In Hicks, the Court applied the principles of Younger v. Harris, see supra notes
91-96, to the case when state criminal proceedings are begun against a federal plaintiff after the federal complaint is filed, but before substantive proceedings have begun
in federal court. 422 U.S. at 349.
165. E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
166. Under the Younger doctrine, the federal district court must abstain from
hearing the merits of a case until the state court remedies are exhausted. See supra
notes 91-96.
167. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 504-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168. Id.
169. Brennan, supra note 155, at 8.
170. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 844-45.
171. See supra notes 113-16 for opposing interpretations of the words of the
tenth amendment.
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intent of the framers 7 2 of the Constitution as sources to support
their view of federalism. These traditional sources of Constitutional
interpretation, however, give us no clear answer as to which side is
correct. As Justice Blackmun wrote in Garcia, "[T]he text of the
Constitution provides the beginning rather than the final answer to
every inquiry into questions of federalism, for '[b]ehind the words of
the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.' ",17In search of these controlling postulates, both sides have

relied on writings of the framers of the Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution themselves, however, had differing views about the purpose fo the federal structure. 174 Each side
to the debate can point to sections of The Federalist Papers, from
example, in support of their positions. 175 Apparently, the framers
were concerned about both states' rights and individual rights, and
in balancing these competing interests, left us no definitive answers
to modern problems of federalism.
The answer to what is the purpose of federalism must come not
from divining the framers intentions but as a policy decision. Do we
want to secure states' rights by giving them an express constitutional bases, or should we instead let the political process alone protect the states' interest? Justice Brennan's answer has been to let
the political process secure the states' interest,7 s and keep the constitutional guarantees for individuals, whose rights are more easily
trampled than those of the states. 177 The alternative, subrogating individual interest to interest of federalism, is not acceptable.
172. Professor Tribe argues that, as a general proposition, the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution is not much help to deciding modern Constitutional debates. L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 45-47 (1985). First, it is often difficult to ascertain a single intent of a group of diverse persons. Id. at 46. And second,
the views of men who lived two hundred years ago are often irrelevant to the
problems of today. The former difficulty is relevant to federalism, but the latter is
not.
173. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1016 (citations omitted).
174. Compare the words of James Madison in THE FEDERALIST No. 39 with the
words of Alexander Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST No. 31. Hamilton wrote:
A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, . . . free from every other
control, but a regard to the public good and to the sense of the people.
THE FEDERALIST No. 31, p. 195 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Madison wrote that "the local or
municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no
more subject, within their repsective spheres, to the general authority than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere." THE FEDERALIST No. 39.
175. E.g., Garcia, 195 S.Ct. at 1028-29 (Powell, J., dissenting; refers to The
Federalist Nos. 45, 46); National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 857, n.1 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 31).
176. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 857 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177. Brennan, The Supreme Court, supra note 25, at 785.
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CONCLUSION

There are several reasons why it is appropriate to discuss Justice Brennan's views on federalism today. First, the controversy over
the proper roles between state and federal governments in areas
such as habeas corpus proceedings is as lively as ever. Second, Justice Brennan has served on the court for thirty terms now. 178 It is
very likely that Justice Brennan's career on the Supreme Court is
near an end, and it is fitting that some testimonial to that career be
given. Third, and most important to our nation, is the effect his
eventual replacement will have on the way the Supreme court
weighs federalism concerns in the future. Presently there is a split
on the Court over the role states' rights should play as limits on
federal power.' 7 9 Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School
has given us convincing evidence of the great impact a single new
justice can have on a Court when there is a split over an issue. 80 An
appointment to the court holding strong views one way or another
will have lasting effect on this nation.' 8 '
Justice Brennan adopted a view of federalism early in his career
which saw the division of power between state and national governments as a mainstay of the founding fathers' designs to secure individual liberties. 8 2 Parallel systems of justice give a double guarantee
that constitutional protections will be upheld.' Justice Brennan in
no way denigrates the role state courts play in upholding constitutional rights. 8 4 He recognizes that often they lead the way in the
expansion of individual liberties. 8 5 He also maintains, however, that
the federal courts, the Supreme Court in particular, have the power
and the duty to uphold constitutional rights.' They would be derelict in their duty if they abdicted this constitutionally - mandated
role to the state courts. 8 7 The strength of our freedom comes from
two guardians of justice. To dispose of either would be a serious mistake. 8 8 Perhaps Justice Brennan's approach to federalism won't
178. The longevity record for Supreme Court justices is thirty-four years, held
by Justice Brennan's late colleague, William 0. Douglas. See W. 0. DOUGLAS, THE
COURT YEARS IX (Vintage Books ed. 1981).
179. Compare, for example, the majority opinion and the dissents in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
180. L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 31-40 (1985); Tribe, What Difference Can A Justice or Two Make?, 71 A.B.A.J. 60 (1985).
181. See supra note 170.
182. Brennan, The Supreme Court, supra note 25, at 784.

183. Id.
184. See supra note 152.
185.

Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, supra note 6, at 947.

186. Id. at 947-48.
187. Id.
188. Brennan, The Supreme Court, supra note 25, at 784.
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solve nagging problems such as overcrowded court dockets,' 89 but it
is the approach that provides the best guarantee of preserving individual rights. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will someday soon end
a lingering controversy and adopt unanimously Justice Brennan's
philosophy of federalism.
Charles J. Corrigan

189.

See supra note 63 and accompanying text.

